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IMPLICATIONS OF MORRISSEY V. BREWER FOR PRISON
DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS IN INDIANA
On September 2nd and 3rd, 1973, inmates at the Indiana State
Prison in Michigan City rioted to dramatize their dissatisfaction with
that institution.1 As one condition for ending their disturbance, they
demanded an end to the prison "kangaroo court system" and changes
in prison disciplinary hearings.2 Similar disturbances in other areas
have produced similar demands.'
The demands of Indiana prisoners for reform of prison disciplinary
procedures are given legal support by several recent federal decisions. In
Morrisey v. Brewer4 the Supreme Court held that parole revocation pro-
ceedings must be conducted in accordance with certain due process re-
quirements. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
has used the approach of Morrissey to find, in United States ex rel.
Miller v. Twomey,' that prison disciplinary proceedings are also subject
to due process protections. Miller 'has already been applied by a district
court to one aspect of Indiana prison discipline, interprison transfers.'
This note will measure other disciplinary procedures against the newly
recognized constitutional requirements.
THE MORRISSEY ANALYSIS
In Morrissey the Supreme Court was confronted with the question of
whether the due process clause required a state to afford parolees a hear-
ing before revoking their parole. In accord with a line of prior cases, the
Court rejected the contention that parole was a privilege,' and held that
1. Indianapolis News, Sept. 3, 1973, at 1, col. 3; Indianapolis Star, Sept. 3, 1973,
at 1, cols. 5-6; Indianapolis News, Sept. 4, 1973, at 1, cols. 1-3; Indianapolis Star, Sept.
4, 1973, at 1, cols. 5-6.
2. Indianapolis News, Sept. 3, 1973, at 1, col. 3; Indianapolis Star, Sept. 4, 1973,
at 1, cols. 5-6. See also Indianapolis News, Oct. 10, 1973, at 1, cols. 4-6 (concerning a
suit to prohibit solitary confinement for more than fifty consecutive days, disciplinary
transfers and other issues).
3. See generally Morris & Hawkins, Commwntary: Attica Revisited: Prospects for
Prison Reform, 14 Ariz. L. REv. 747, 750 (1972).
4. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
5. 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973).
6. Aikens v. Lash, Civil No. 72 S 129 (N.D. Ind., filed Jan. 23, 1974).
7. 408 U.S. at 481. See also Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) ; Goldberg
v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) ; Kraft, Prison Disciplinary Practices and Procedures: Is
Due Process Provided?, 47 N. DAK. L. REv. 9, 11-21 (1970); Wick, Procedural Due
Process in Prison Disciplinary Hearings: The Case for Specific Constitutional Require-
quireinents, 18 S. DAK. L. REv. 309 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Wick]. See generally
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parole revocation required due process protections. To reach this con-
clusion, the Court looked to whether the interest of the parolee which
was subject to deprivation was within the contemplation of the liberty
or property language of the fourteenth amendment.' The Court also
looked to the seriousness of the loss.9 It concluded that a parolee's
interest in continued liberty, while subject to some restrictions, involves
"many of the core values of unqualified liberty and its termination inflicts
a 'grievous loss' .... 2"'
By holding that liberty need not be unqualified, the Court implicitly
accepts a notion of relative liberty, the deprivation of which, if sufficiently
grievous, requires some amount of due process protection. The exact
nature of this protection is then determined by balancing the interests
of the individual, the state and society."
In Morrissey, the Court concluded that while parole revocation does
not call for the full panoply of rights due a defendant in a criminal
proceeding,'2 six constitutional procedures were required.' First, an
informal hearing must be held to determine if reasonable grounds exist
to believe that the parolee violated a parole condition. The parolee must
be given the opportunity to be heard at this hearing. Second, at the
revocation hearing, the parolee must be given written notice of the
charges against him or her. Third, 'the parolee must have the opportunity
to be heard, present evidence, and call voluntary witnesses. Fourth, the
opportunity to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses must be
made available where appropriate.' 4 Fifth, the hearing board must be
"neutral and detached," and finally, written findings and the reasons
therefor must be furnished the parolee.
EXTENSION OF MORRISSEY TO DISCIPLINARY HEARINGS
In United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey,'" the analysis of Mor-
rissey was applied to prison disciplinary hearings. In Miller, one group
of inmates had been deprived of good time without a prior hearing."
Singer, MorrLssey tv. Brewer, Implications for the Future of Correctional Law, 1 Pais. L.
RP,. 287 (1972); The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HAgv. L. REv. 1, 101-02 (1972).
8. 408 U.S. at 481.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 482.
11. Id. at 481. See also Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886 (1961).
12. 408 U.S. at 480.
13. Id. at 489.
14. This right may be denied if "the hearing officer specifically finds good cause
for not allowing confrontation." Id. at 489.
15. 479 F.2d 701 (7th Cir. 1973).
16. Id. at 704. "Good time" is a statutory means of sentence reduction. If an in-
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The Miller court found that good time is closely analogous to revocation
of parole in that both directly affect the total length of imprisonment.
As a result, the court had little difficulty in holding that, as in Morrissey,
due process protections were required before good time could be
rescinded."
The Miller court confronted a greater obstacle in applying Mor-
rissey to proceedings in which an inmate faced the prospect of punitive
segregation."8 However, by employing a concept of relative liberty, the
court concluded that
additional punishment inflicted upon an inmate may be suf-
ficiently severe, and may represent a sufficiently drastic change
from the custodial status theretofore enjoyed, that it must be
classified as a "grievous loss."' 9
A deprivation of relative liberty was sufficient to trigger the operation of
minimum due process requirements in disciplinary hearings. The same
analysis has also been applied in Aikens v. Lash" to interprison trans-
fers. Such transfers were considered akin to punitive segregation, and
hence, resulted in "grievous loss" of an inmate's liberty.
Whether minimum due process is required, then, depends on whether
potential sanctions cause a grievous loss of liberty. Since punishment
for major rule violations21 may include loss of good time and punitive
mate has no rule infractions and performs the duties assigned him or her for a given
length of time, he or she is entitled to a predetermined diminution of his or her sentence.
The warden or superintendent of an institution may revoke previously earned "good
time" and the right to earn "good time" as punishment for rule infractions.
17. 479 F.2d at 714-15.
18. Id. at 716. Punitive segregation involves confinement in a small, austere, often
darkened cell and deprivation of items such as soap, towel, toothbrush, mattress, toilet
paper and reading material. Inmates in punitive segregation are allowed little, if any,
recreation and usually have contact only with guards. Leonard Orland, a law professor
who spent eighteen hours of a simulated prison experience in punitive segregation, de-
scribed the experience as "one of the most painful of my life." L. ORLAND, JUSTICE,
PUNISHMENT, TREATMENT 277 (1973).
19. 479 F.2d at 717.
20. Civil No. 72 S 129 (N.D. Ind., filed Jan. 23, 1974).
21. In Indiana major rule violations include: being guilty of four minor rule
violations within a ninety day period; gambling; intoxication; intentional or careless de-
struction of or damage to state property; escape or attempted escape; possession of
contraband; sexual relations or attempted acts of sexual gratification with another per-
son; participating and/or inciting disturbance of the peace, institutional routine, or riot;
any act punishable by state law. Indiana Department of Correction, Adult Authority
Disciplinary Procedures, Sept. 17, 1973, at 5-6 [hereinafter cited as Indiana Manual]. Al-
though major rule violations are usually punished by loss of good time or punitive segre-
gation, other punishments include: loss of commissary, movie, television, and recreation
privileges; administrative segregation of varying severity; and transfer to another insti-
tution. Id. at 4-7. Although on paper these punishments may not seem harsh, in the
prison context where seemingly trivial privileges become very important to inmates, depri-
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segregation, proceedings to determine whether such violations have oc-
curred require due process protections. 2 Once the seriousness of the
inmate's interest triggers the need for these protections, the specific re-
quirements are determined by balancing the interests of the state, the
individual and society. Outside of the case where immediate action by.
prison officials is required to avoid imminent physical injury, the interest
of the state is not sufficient to deny procedural protection." Indeed in
the case of intraprison disciplinary hearings, as in the case of parole
revocation under Morrissey, the state's interests in accurately determining
the facts, providing rehabilitation, and preventing arbitrary treatment,
appear consistent with minimum procedural protections."
INDIANA PROCEDURES
24 a
Although Miller adopted the approach of Morrissey in holding
that due process is required in prison disciplinary proceedings, the
Miller court was reluctant to detail the specific procedures required.
The Federal District Court for the Northern District of Indiana has
followed Miller and Morrissey in outlining the procedures that are re-
quired for interprison transfers.2 Other aspects of Indiana prison
discipline, however, must be examined to determine if current state rules
2-
vation or curtailment of these privileges is often viewed as a great hardship. Also, since'
a summary of every disciplinary problem is placed in the inmate's file, id. at 2, it is pos-
sible that parole could be denied or postponed on the basis of an inmate's disciplinary
record. These considerations underscore the importance of intraprison disciplinary ac-
tions to the inmate in terms of both the conditions and length of confinement.
22. United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 714-19 (7th Cir. 1973).
23. Id. at 718-19.
24. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972). Compare Worley v.
Bounds, 355 F. Supp. 115, 122 (W.D.N.C. 1973) ("Rational and fair processes within
prison can only aid in showing a willing prisoner the benefits of orderly procedures."),
and Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 197 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049
(1972) (it is speculation to say whether giving prisoners due process rights will pro-
mote rehabilitation), with Millemann, Prison Disciplinary Hearings and Procedural Due
Process-The Requirement of a Full Administrative Hearing, 31 MD. L. Rav. 27, 49
(1971) (due process is not intended to promote rehabilitation but rather to prevent arbi-
trary action).
24a. After this note was written, the Indiana legislature passed a statute revising
the system for granting and revoking good time. The statute codifies many of the pro-
cedural safeguards suggested in this note-written notice of proposed good time revoca-
tion, an impartial hearing board, opportunity for the inmate to speak in his or her de-
fense and to request witnesses, confrontation and cross-examination of adverse witnesses,
representation by a lay advocate, a written statement of findings upon request and ad-
ministrative review by the Commissioner of Correction. IND. CODE §§ 11-7-6.5-1 to -8
(1974), am1ending IND. CODE §§ 11-7 (1971). However, since these protections apply
only to revocation of good time, not imposition of punitive segregation, this aspect of
prison discipline is still covered by the Department of Correction's procedures discussed
in the remaining portion of this note.
25. Aikens v. Lash, Civil No. 72 S 129 (N.D. Ind., filed Jan. 23, 1974).
26. The Indiana Department of Correction has adopted a detailed procedure for
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satisfy procedural due process standards.
Promulgation of Rules in Advance
It is unjust to punish an individual for conduct which was not pre-
viously prohibited.27 Moreover, when proscribed conduct it too vague to
identify, punishment for such conduct violates the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment." Although prison regulations need not meet
the rigid standards applied to criminal statutes, they must be reasonably
prison disciplinary actions against an inmate who has allegedly committed a major rule
violation. See note 21 supra. When a guard determines a major rule violation has oc-
curred, he or she files a disciplinary report. Within twenty-four hours of the filing, the
inmate involved is given written notification of the charge. As soon as possible, the
Conduct Adjustment Board holds a hearing at which the inmate may speak in her or his
own defense, denying, admitting, or explaining the charges. At the hearing the inmate
is not allowed to present voluntary witnesses, to confront or cross-examine his or her
accuser, or to be represented by counsel although he or she may be represented by a
member of the prison staff. The results of the hearing and disposition are given orally
to the inmate; she or he may also request a written copy of the Board's findings. An in-
mate may appeal an adverse decision to the head of the institution and then to the head
of the Department of Correction. Department of Correction, Adult Authority Discip-
linary Procedures, Sept. 17, 1973, at 1-2 [hereinafter cit&t as Indiana Procedures]; In-
diana Manual, supra note 21, at 1-5.
In explaining the policies behind its disciplinary procedures, the Indiana Department
of Correction contrasts the conditions of society in general with those of prison:
The most clear difference is that because a relatively small portion of the gen-
eral population will perform, condone or tolerate anti-social behavior (crimi-
nal conduct) our system of criminal justice presumes innocence and correct so-
cial behavior. In contrast, we must postulate all correctional procedures upon
the knowledge that every one of the prisoners have at least once performed a
crime. . . . Many of these prisoners have demonstrated their willingness to
use violence to achieve their ends.
Indiana Procedures, supra, at 1. This passage almost suggests a presumption of guilt.
Another assumption supporting the informality of the hearing is that since a small pro-
portion of the inmate population comprises most of the disciplinary problems, moncy,
time and energy is better spent on rehabilitation. Id. at 2. It appears that these assump-
tions underlie the relative weights given to the various interests by the Indiana Depart-
ment of Correction.
The current disciplinary procedures of the Indiana Department of Correction are
the product of a recent modification of the procedures that were developed in response
to a serious disturbance at the Pendleton facility in September, 1969, which resulted in
the death and wounding of a number of inmates. Following the disturbance the Indiana
Civil Liberties Union brought suit against the Department of Correction to mitigate
conditions that had led to and followed the riot and also to obtain long range relief in a
number of areas, including disciplinary hearings. After a long series of negotiations
between the Department of Correction and the ICLU, a settlement was reached. Among
other provisions, the settlement allowed inmates to cross-examine their accusers and to
call witnesses at disciplinary hearings-rights which they are not afforded under current
departmental policy but which may be required by Morrissey. 408 U.S. at 489.
27. See, e.g., Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964).
28. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972); Jordan
v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223 (1951).
Although Morrissey does not mention the principle that it is unjust to punish an
individual for conduct which was not previously defined as prohibited, this omission may
be because the rules of parole are more individualized than those regulating the highly
structured life of prison.
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clear and precise in order to inform prisoners, guards and members of
the hearing board of prohibited behavior.29 The rationale for this re-
quirement is clear: "Nothing is more violative of the ideal of rehabili-
tation than the arbitrary imposition of punishment for 'misconduct' which
a prisoner did not realize was prohibited.""0
Indiana's prison disciplinary rules generally recognize this principle
by requiring that "rules be expressed in writing in clear and under-
standable language . . . positive in character and minimum in
number . . [and] known by all concerned."'" However, the disci-
plinary procedures also provide for punishment of rule infractions "not
specifically set forth in the . . . Inmate Handbook . . ."" There-
fore, the possibility remains for an inmate to be punished for a major
rule violation although the rule is unwritten.
Notice and Timing of the Hearing
In Morrissey the Court required written notice of the alleged parole
violation and disclosure of evidence against the parolee so that he or
she could prepare a defense.3 Under Indiana practice, an inmate must
be notified in writing within twenty-four hours after a disciplinary
report has been filed,3" but there is no requirement that he or she be
informed of the factual basis of the charge.3" This procedure creates
the possibility that the inmate may not fully understand the charge
until the time of the hearing, thus precluding an adequate defense and
amounting to a denial of due process unless the hearing is postponed."
In Miller, the court was unsure whether Morrissey required dis-
closure of all or some of the evidence. It avoided the issue by allowing
state officials to specify the "appropriate time and form of written
notice."3  The Miller approach de-emphasizes trial-type procedures
29. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479-80 (1972) ; Wick, supra note 7, at
321.
30. Wick, supra note 7, at 321. See also Gates v. Collier, 349 F. Supp. 881, 895, 899
(N.D. Miss. 1972); Rhen v. McGrath, 326 1. Supp. 681, 691 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); Land-
man v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 655-56 (E.D. Va. 1971) (detailed discussion of speci-
ficity of rules in prison).
31. Indiana Manual, supra note 21, at 1. See also IND. CODE § 11-2-1-7 (1971),
IND. ANN. STAT. § 13-239 (1971).
32. Indiana Manual, supra note 21, at 2.
33. 408 U.S. at 489.
34. Indiana Manual, supra note 21, at 1-2. The inmate may be granted additional
time to prepare a defense at the discretion of the hearing board. Id. at 2.
35. Question now exists concerning this Indiana procedure in light of Aikens. It
held notice of changes was required at least two days prior to an interprison transfer
hearing. Aikens v. Lash, Civil No. 72 S 129 (N.D. Ind., filed Jan. 23, 1974).
36. Holland v. Oliver, 350 F. Supp. 485, 487 (E.D. Va. 1972).
37. 479 F.2d at 716 & n.33. Contra, Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1086
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and relies on the discretion of correctional officials for the development
of hearing procedures.38 However, more detailed standards regarding
notice would undoubtedly better protect inmates' rights without unduly
burdening the prison staff. Indiana practice should require sufficient
disclosure of evidence to inform the prisoner of the nature of the charges
against him or her.
In addition, since an inmate is often placed in maximum security
prior to a disciplinary hearing, just as a parolee is often incarcerated
prior to a parole revocation hearing, he or she faces an arbitrary and
relatively great loss of liberty until disposition of the case. While the
inmate's interest in a prompt hearing is tempered by the state's interest
in maintaining order and security in emergency situations, Miller notes
that even in riot situations
after the immediate crises is past, the relative importance of
the inmate's interest in a fair evaluation of the facts increases
and the state's interest in summary disposition lessens. 9
Indiana's procedure states that the hearing should be held as soon
as practicable, but there can be no prehearing detention for more than
five days without review by the Institution Head.4" At least in theory,
these requirements appear to be a reasonable reconciliation of the
parties' conflicting needs. Yet, no guarantee exists that only those
inmates who display a proclivity towards violence would face maxi-
mum security detention before a hearing. It is therefore possible that
a peaceful inmate, charged with a nonviolent major rule violation, could
be placed in solitary confinement for prehearing detention. Since
Morrissey is based on a premise which requires the minimum amount
(M.D. Fla. 1973) (requiring written notice, personally delivered to the inmate, allowing
him or her a reasonable time to prepare a defense; notice must include a statement of the
factual basis for the charge and the name and number of the rule allegedly violated) ;
Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 782 (N.D. Cal. 1971). See also Holland v.
Oliver, 350 F. Supp. 485, 487 (E.D. Va. 1972) ; Colligan v. United States, 349 F. Supp.
1233, 1237-38 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
38. Miller also allows state correctional officials to determine the
extent to which evidence must be disclosed; the method for enabling a prisoner
to explain or rebut the charges, including, if appropriate, an indication of the
situations in which [the inmate] may insist that witnesses be called or at least
interviewed; and the extent to which a written statement of the disposition of
the charge should be made.
479 F.2d at 716.
39. Id. at 717-18; cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 483 (1972) ("summary
treatment . . . [may be necessary to control] a large group of potentially disruptive
prisoners."). See also Note, Due Process Safeguards in Prison Disciplinary Proceed-
ings: The Application of the Goldberg Balancing Test, 49 N. DAK. L. REV. 675, 678
(1973).
40. Indiana Manual, supra note 21, at 2.
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of detention necessary,41 prison officials should distinguish between
violent and nonviolent infractions before approving prehearing detention.
Also, hearings should be held as promptly as possible to avoid excessive
detention.
Opportunity to be Heard
Virtuality all courts that have dealt with prison disciplinary hear-
ings4 2 and the Indiana Department of Correction,43 agree that the right
of an individual to appear before a hearing committee to explain his or
her version of the facts is essential for fundamental fairness. However,
disagreement exists on how far this right extends. Morrissey allows a
parolee to present a reasonable number of voluntary witnesses," but
Miller and Aikens grant inmates only a right to request witnesses."5
Thus, Miller and Aikens keep open the possibility that a request will be
denied, leaving the inmate unable to substantiate his or her version of the
facts.
Although Indiana's procedure allows an inmate to explain his or her
conduct, it apparently does not allow an inmate to call or even to request
any witnesses because "it may be assumed that many will want to testify
to avoid work . . . ."" Since hearings could be held at times when
prisoners are not working, this consideration hardly seems compelling.
In order to avoid any such problems, the hearing board could easily limit
both the number of witnesses and the scope of their testimony on grounds
of relevance. This less restrictive alternative is important because without
the ability to call witnesses, the inmate must rely on those persons brought
to the attention of the board only through the often inadequate and biased
medium of the investigating officer's report." With reasonable restric-
tions, the right to call witnesses will not burden the hearing process, but
enhance its ability to find facts.
41. 408 U.S. at 487.
42. E.g., United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 716 (7th Cir. 1973) ;
Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 198 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972) ;
cf. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 488 (1972) ; Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 267
(1970).
43. Indiana Procedures, supra note 26, at 2.
44. 408 U.S. at 489.
45. 479 F.2d at 716; Aikens v. Lash, Civil No. 72 S 129 (N.D. Ind., filed Jan. 23,
1974). Specifically, Aikens requires a fair opportunity to request witnesses be called or
interviewed in the inmate's presence. Id.
46. Indiana Procedures, supra note 26, at 1.
47. See, e.g., Harvard Center for Criminal Justice, Judicial Interlvention inr Prison
Discipline, 63 J. Cgilm. L.C. & P.S. 200, 208 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Judicial Inter-
wention], which discusses the frequent inadequacy of the investigating officer's report.
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Confrontation and Cross-Examination of Accusers
Closely tied to the controversey over the right to call voluntary
witnesses is the issue of whether an inmate should be allowed to confront
and cross-examine his or her accusers. Some argue that allowing pri-
soners this right will result in loss of respect for supervisory personnel
and the possibility of reprisals against adverse witnesses.4" For these
reasons, Miller declined to permit confrontation,49 although Morrissey
and Aikens required this procedure unless the hearing officer specifically
found reasons not to do so."° Indiana procedure does not allow confron-
tation or cross-examination because it would undermine the guards' abili-
ties to deal with inmates and would be an undue imposition on their
time.5' The Department of Correction assumes that all prisoners will
attempt to turn hearings into guard-baiting sessions. However, the hear-
ing board could easily prohibit caustic or vindictive questioning, and
with limitations on the scope and nature of cross-examination, the pos-
sibility of a guard's being embarrassed is minimal. Also, the time spent
requiring guards to attend hearings must be balanced against the crucial
fact that confrontation and cross-examination are valuable methods for
ascertaining the veracity of testimony and are "of fundamental impor-
tance in administrative proceedings where the ordinary rules of proce-
dure are relaxed." 2
Trial-type cross-examination is not necessarily required. As an
alternative to trial-type cross-examination, the hearing board could ques-
tion adverse witnesses. This method would promote accurate fact-finding
without detracting from the dispositional aspect of the hearing;" it would
also minimize overly harsh cross-examination which may cause guards
to retaliate against the inmate.54 With reasonable modification,55 cross-
48. E.g., Indiana Procedures, supra note 26, at 1.
49. 479 F.2d at 718.
50. 408 U.S. at 489; Aikens v. Lash, Civil No. 72 S 129 (N.D. Ind., filed Jan. 23,
1974). Aikens' holding that inmates must be allowed to cross-examine adverse witnesses
in transfer hearings casts doubt on the Indiana rule prohibiting cross-examination and
confrontation in disciplinary hearings. Aikens allows cross-examination of all adverse
witnesses at the transfer hearing or interview, unless "the written record shall reflect
sufficient proof of the reliability of [an] anonymous informant." Id. at -. Aikens
does not specify how the reliability of an informant is to be established.
51. Indiana Procedures, supra note 26, at 1-2.
52. Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1087 (M.D. Fla. 1973).
53. Note, Decency and Fairness: An Energing Judicial Role in Prison Reform, 57
VA. L. REv. 841, 874 (1971). See also Jacob, Prison Discipline and Inmnate Rights, 5
H.av. Civ. RIGHTS-CIv. Lmn. L. REV. 227, 247-48 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Jacob].
54. Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1088 (M.D. Fla. 1973). Confronta-
tion and questioning of inmate accusers, as well as the accused, by the hearing board
would also limit the possibility of inventing charges out of malice.
55. One such modification would be to allow the inmate's counsel or counsel sub-
314
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examination and confrontation should be permitted in disciplinary hear-
ings.
Impartial and Detached Hearing Board
The requirement that the hearing board be neutral is a basic prin-
ciple of procedural due process, accepted by the Supreme Court in Mor-
rissey,"0 the court in Miller,57 and the Indiana Department of Correc-
tion."8  However, all three attempt to achieve neutrality simply by re-
quiring no prior involvement in the case. Since the purpose of neutrality
is presumably to remove bias in adjudication, allowing only prison of-
ficials to comprise the hearing board may not adequately ensure impar-
tiality.
Empirical studies indicate that hearing officers in intraprison dis-
ciplinary hearings de-emphasize fact-finding and tend to believe staff
members rather than inmates."9 To remedy this lack of objectivity, it has
been suggested that the hearing board be composed exclusively of people
outside the prison system."0 This proposal overemphasizes the objec-
tive, fact-finding function of the hearing at the expense of the need to
consider subjective factors in reaching a solution appropriately tailored
to the rehabilitative needs of individual prisoners. A better balance of
interests would be maintained by a hearing board composed of both in-
terested nonprison persons and prison personnel. If the non-prison
persons are able to function independently, such a hearing board could
increase objectivity without sacrificing correctional ideals. In addition,
stitute to cross-examine witnesses. Wick, supra note 7, at 324. South Carolina employs
this practice except the inmate representative cannot attack the staff's credibility in the
presence of the accused. Pearson v. Townsend, 362 F. Supp. 207, 222-23 (D.S.C. 1973).
Aikens allowed an inmate to be represented by a lay advocate of his or her own choosing.
If the lay advocate is an inmate, he or she must be confined in the same institution as
the accused and cannot be confined in segregation. Aikens v. Lash, Civil No. 72 S 129
(N.D. Ind., filed Jan. 23, 1974).
56. 408 U.S. at 486, 489.
57. 479 F.2d at 718. See also Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1084-85
(M.D. Fla. 1973); Meyers v. Alldredge, 348 F. Supp. 807, 823-24 (M.D. Pa. 1972);
Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165, 172-73 (D. Md. 1971) ; Clutchette v. Procunier, 328
F. Supp. 767, 784 (N.D. Cal. 1971). Contra, Baker v. Beto, 349 F. Supp. 1263, 1267
(S.D. Tex. 1972) (officer initiating charge may sit on hearing committee).
58. Indiana Procedures, supra note 26, at 2. It is suggested that one member of the
Board should be a "minority group person." Indiana Manual, supra note 21, at 4. The
Conduct Adjustment Board is composed of at least three members of the staff who are
appointed by the Institution Head. According to Indiana procedures, the ideal composi-
tion of the Conduct Adjustment Board would be: the Assistant Institution Head or his
designate, a noncustodial member of the staff, and one representative from other institu-
tion departments. Id.
59. Judicial Inteevention, supra note 47, at 213.
60. Wick, supra note 7, at 324.
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the presence of citizen and inmate observers might increase inmate con-
fidence in the hearing system."'
Counsel and Counsel Substitutes
The question of representation by counsel was not reached in Mor-
rissey" but in Gagon v. Scarpelli," the Supreme Court stated:
[T]he effectiveness of the rights guaranteed by Morrissey may
in some circumstances depend on the use of skills which the
probationer or parolee is unlikely to possess."4
The Court then ordered a case-by-case determination of whether counsel
would be appropriate in parole and probation revocation hearings.6 5 In
evaluating the need for counsel, the Court suggested that the relevant
factors to be considered were the need for cross-examination, the com-
plexity of the facts, and the probationer's or parolee's capacity for self-
expression.66 The Court did not recognize a general right to counsel
because to do so would upset the balance between accurate fact-finding
and "the predictive and discretionary" nature of post-conviction hear-
ings. 6
7
Indiana does not allow counsel at any prison disciplinary hearings,
although an inmate charged with a major rule violation may request the
assistance of a prison staff member. 8 However, in light of recent rulings
in the context of parole revocation hearings, the Indiana practice should
be re-evaluated.6 " As in parole and probation revocation hearings, in
61. See Jacob, supra note 53, at 276.
62. 408 U.S. at 489.
63. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
64. Id. at 786.
65. Id. at 790-91.
66. Id. at 787, 790-91.
67. Id. at 787. In Russell v. Douthitt, - Ind. - , 304 N.E.2d 793 (1973), the
Indiana Supreme Court reluctantly followed Gagnon, noting however:
those involved in parole revocation can take no other course than to appoint
counsel in all cases and to have a full-blown trial for every alleged charge of
parole violation.
Id. at - , 304 N.E.2d at 794.
68. Indiana Manual, supra note 21, at 4. Cases allowing counsel substitutes include:
Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062, 1088-89 (M.D. Fla. 1973) ; Colligan v. United
States, 349 F. Supp. 1233, 1238 (E.D. Mich. 1972) ; Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp.
621 (E.D. Va. 1971); Bundy v. Cannon, 328 F. Supp. 165 (D. Md. 1971). Johnson v.
Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969), by holding that prison officials cannot forbid inmates from
aiding other inmates in preparing habeas corpus petitions, may indicate that in the ab-
sence of better legal assistance, inmates may give legal aid to fellow inmates in other
situations, such as disciplinary hearings.
69. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (counsel necessary in certain cir-
cumstances) ; United States ex rel. Miller v. Twomey, 479 F.2d 701, 718 n.36 (7th Cir.
1973) (doubtful that counsel is necessary); Pearson v. Townsend, 362 F. Supp. 207,
222-23 (D.S.C. 1973) ; cf. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970).
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unusual circumstances, such as where the inmate is unable to express
himself or herself, the facts are complex or the alleged rule violation is a
criminal offense, counsel should be provided." Where a rule violation
is also a criminal offense lack of counsel is probably unconstitutional.'
An attorney is necessary at the prison hearing to assure that appropriate
steps are taken to preserve the inmate's defenses to a criminal charge
arising from the same conduct. Representation can provide skilled cross-
examination for the inmate and can remove the dilemma of having to
forfeit either the fifth amendment right to remain silent or the right to
respond to prison charges. 2
Use of a prison staff member as a representative73 presents three ad-
ditional problems. First, since no privilege exists between the staff mem-
ber and the inmate, an inmate may not fully cooperate in the preparation
of his or her defense. Second, the two roles played by the staff member
would inevitably pose difficult conflict of interest problems.7 ' Third, the
staff member is unequipped and unskilled to handle work of this kind.
Even if lawyers are not utilized, these problems could be avoided by the
use of legal paraprofessionals, law students, prison ombudsmen, or even
other inmates75 as counsel substitutes.
Written Statement of Findings, Reasons and Disposition
A written decision of the hearing board, stating reasons for the
decision and summarizing the evidence, is required by Morrissey and
Aikens7 A written report is essential so that administrative and judicial
70. See Russell v. Douthitt, - Ind. -, 304 N.E.2d 793 (1973).
71. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
72. In Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767 (N.D. Cal. 1971), the court found
the need for counsel in disciplinary hearings where the inmate was charged with a rule
infraction which was also punishable under state law to be "more compelling . . . than
in Miranda." Id. at 778-79; accord, Carter v. McGinnis, 351 F. Supp. 787 (W.D.N.Y.
1972). Sands v. Wainwright, 357 F. Supp. 1062 (M.D. FIa. 1973), rejects the Clutchette
remedy, and instead grants the inmate "use" immunity so that his or her testimony in
the prison proceeding may not be used "affirmatively against him" or her in a later crimi-
nal prosecution. Id. at 1093; accord, Palmigiano v. Baxter, 487 F.2d 1280, 1288-90 (1st
Cir. 1973) ; cf. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) (holding that testimony
given to establish standing to bring a motion to suppress illegally obtained evidence may
not be used against the defendant on the issue of guilt or innocence at his or her trial).
See also Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972) (upholding a federal statute
granting "use" and "derivative use" immunity). Kastigar raises questions as to the
scope of 'use" immunity in the context of prison disciplinary hearings.
73. Indiana Manual, supra note 21, at 4.
74. Wick, supra note 7, at 323; Judicial Intervention, .rpra note 47, at 208.
75. See note 55 supra.
76. 408 U.S. at 489; Aikens v. Lash, Civil No. 72 S 129 (N.D. Ind., filed Jan. 23,
1974). See also Childs v. United States Board of Parole, 14 CRIm. L. REP. 2135 (D.D.C.
1973) (Parole Board required to provide written reasons for denial of parole). Aikens
not only requires a written, reasoned decision, but sets a standard of decisionmaking.
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review may ensure that the decision is based on evidence presented at the
hearing."
The Indiana prison disciplinary procedure does not satisfy the Mor-
rissey and Aikens requirements. It provides that a written statement
should be furnished the inmate if requested."' This written report con-
tains only the "findings" of the disciplinary hearing board."9 Thus, if
Morrissey's analysis is extended to intraprison disciplinary hearings a
fuller statement of reasons for the decision would be required in every
case.
Appeal
Although neither Morrissey nor Miller mentions the right to appeal
as an essential element of procedural due process, an appellate procedure
is desirable as a means of monitoring and correcting abuses in disci-
plinary hearings.8" Indiana allows review of decisions that result in loss
of good time or punitive segregation by the warden, and then by the head
of the correctional system.8 While this procedure results in no review
by a disinterested body, it is probably adequate to protect inmates from
arbitrary treatment in most cases. For this reason, and because Morrissey
and Miller lack such a requirement, the Indiana procedure would probably
satisfy any judicially determined procedural due process requirement of
appellate review.82
CONCLUSION
In applying Morrissey to prison disciplinary hearings, courts, ad-
Under this standard, all decisions must be supported by "substantial evidence." Aikens
v. Lash, supra at - . Aikens also requires a copy be given to the inmate. Id. at -.
77. See Colligan v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 1233, 1238 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
See also Pearson v. Townsend, 362 F. Supp. 207, 223-24 (D.S.C. 1973) ; Landman v. Roy-
ster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 653 (E.D. Va. 1971) ; Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767,
783-84 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
78. Indiana Manual, supra note 21, at 2.
79. Id.
80. Cases requiring an appellate procedure include: Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp.
451, 457 (N.D. Ind. 1972) ; Meyers v. Alldredge, 348 F. Supp. 807, 823 (M.D. Pa. 1972)
(dictum). Review was not required in: Landman v. Royster, 333 F. Supp. 621, 653
(E.D. Va. 1971) ; Clutchette v. Procunier, 328 F. Supp. 767, 784 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
81. Indiana Manual, supra note 21, at 4-5. All decisions which result in loss of
good time, punitive segregation, or change in status are to be automatically reviewed by
the head of the institution who may confirm the decisions or order more extensive or
new proceedings. The inmate is then allowed to appeal to the head of the Department
of Correction or his designate. Id. Aikens also requires administrative review by the
Commissioner of Correction or his designate. Aikens v. Lash, Civil No. 72 S 129 (N.D.
Ind., filed Jan. 23, 1974).
82. Review of significant deprivations of liberty in violation of the Constitution may
be had in habeas corpus proceedings. See Note, Habeas Corpus vs. Prison Regulations:
A Struggle in Constitutional Theory, 54 MARQ. L. Ruv. 50 (1971).
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ministrators, and inmates will inevitable differ as to the weight to be
given various factors in carrying out the balancing that due process
analysis requires. The current procedures of the Indiana Department of
Correction represent its effort at balancing, but the courts will inevitably
be required to re-evaluate the state's determination. Courts should find
that Indiana's procedures for notice, appeal and hearing board neutrality
adequately promote administrative fairness. However, procedures limit-
ing the right to call witnesses and to cross-examine should be found in-
adequate to assure factual accuracy. Efficiency should not be so heavily
weighted that the inmate's right to fairness is abrogated.
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